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State v. Carroll, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (Apr. 7, 2016)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENTS
Summary
Defendant Deangelo Carroll appealed from a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder
and first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court of Nevada found the
district court erred in denying Carroll’s motion to suppress his statements to police because the
police subjected Carroll to a custodial interrogation, without advising him of his Miranda2 rights.
The Court affirmed however, finding the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Background
Carroll was an employee at the Palomino Club. Palomino Club management recruited
Carroll to “knock off” a prior employee, Timothy Hadland, who was spreading negative rumors
about the club. Carroll recruited Kenneth Counts as the individual who would “knock off” the
former employee. Carroll contacted Hadland on the night of the murder and arranged to meet
Hadland that evening. When Hadland noticed Carroll in the Palomino Club Van he walked to the
driver’s side window where Carroll was sitting. As Hadland and Carroll talked, Counts existed the
van through the side door, snuck around to the front, and fired two shots into Hadland’s head.
The evening after Hadland’s murder, homicide detectives contacted Carroll at the
Palomino club. Carroll agreed to speak with detectives and he was driven to the homicide office
for questioning. The detectives did not give Carroll Miranda warnings before questioning him.
Carroll implicated himself, Palomino Club management, and Counts in Hadland’s murder. Carroll
also volunteered to wear a recording device to corroborate his story by speaking with the Palomino
Club management. The information obtained from these recordings allowed the State to charge
three members of Palomino Club management for their roles in Hadland’s murder.
After detectives finished obtaining information and evidence from Carroll, they arrested
him. As a result, the State charged Carroll with conspiracy to commit murder and murder with use
of a deadly weapon. A jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. Carroll appealed.
Discussion
On appeal, Carroll argued: 1) the wire recordings should not have been admitted against
him at trial because they were not relevant, were prejudicial, consisted of inadmissible hearsay,
and violated his right against self-incrimination; 2) the district court erred when it admitted his
statements to the detectives because the detectives violated Miranda and coerced his statement; 3)
there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy to commit murder, first
degree murder, and the deadly weapon enhancement; and 4) cumulative error warrants reversal.
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Wire recordings
Whether the relevance of the recordings was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
Carroll contended the district court abused its discretion by admitting wire tape recordings
because they were not relevant to his guilt or innocence and were unfairly prejudicial. Carroll
argued he played a role assigned to him by detectives, and jurors would not be able to discern
which statements he fabricated, and which the detectives fabricated.
At the outset, the Court dismissed the State’s contention that because Carroll referenced
the recordings in his closing argument he cannot attack their relevance. The Court reviewed for
plain error 3 because Carroll did not object. The Court found Carroll’s relevancy argument
meritless under NRS 48.015 because a review of the wire recordings demonstrated relevance as
the facts supported both Carroll’s position that there was never meant to be a killing, and the State’s
that a killing was intended.4 The Court also found Carroll’s prejudice argument meritless as the
evidence was extremely probative based on the fact that the central issue of the case was Carroll’s
intent. The Court explained that any prejudice was explained away when the jury heard the proper
context of Carroll’s statements. The Court found Carroll could not demonstrate plain error.
Whether Carroll’s statements were inadmissible hearsay
Carroll argued his statements on the recordings were not his own, but those of a state actor.
The Court reviewed for plain error because counsel Carroll did not object at trial based on hearsay.5
The Court found the statements were not inadmissible hearsay because they were offered
to provide context to the statements of the Palomino Club managers. The Court noted that even if
the statements were provided for their truth, they would still be admissible as statements of a party
under NRS 51.035(3)(a). The Court held the statements admissible because there was no evidence
indicating the police instructed Carroll what to say and they were not offered to prove their truth.
Whether the statements of the managers of the Palomino Club were made in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
Carroll contended the statements of the Palomino Club’s managers on the wire recordings
were not admissible because the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carroll
also contended that because he withdrew from the conspiracy by acting as the State’s agent, the
statements were not made by coconspirators and were therefore inadmissible.
The Court found Carroll’s argument that he was no longer part of the conspiracy
unpersuasive because a defendant need not be a member of the conspiracy at the time the statement
was made, so long as the declarant was part of the conspiracy when the statement was made and
the defendant was a part of the same conspiracy at some point.6 The Court noted Carroll did not
make his withdrawal from the conspiracy known to the coconspirators nor did he make a “clean
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See Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 614, 137 P.3d 1137, 1142 (2006).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.015 (“any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
5
See Baltazar-Monterrosa, 122 Nev. at 614, 137 P.3d at 1142.
6
See McDowell v. State, 103 Nev. 527, 529—30, 746 P.2d 149, 150 (1987)
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breast” to authorities when he told multiple stories to detectives in an attempt to minimize
culpability.7
The Court also found Carroll’s argument that the statements were not made in furtherance
of the conspiracy to be meritless as Carroll’s citation to Davis 8 was inapplicable. The Court
concluded the statements were admissible because even if Carroll had withdrawn from the
conspiracy, the other members had not, rendering the statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Whether the club managers’ statements violated Carroll’s right against self-incrimination
Carroll argued the admission of the managers’ statements violated his right against selfincrimination because he had to choose between forfeiting his right to explain the statements or
his right to not testify. Carroll contended this violated his substantial rights because the State
referenced his fabricated statements as proof that he intended to kill Hadland rather than to commit
battery. The Court held Carroll’s constitutional rights were not violated because the statements did
not force him to testify and both parties provided the proper context for the statements.
The Court noted that although Carroll did not object nor preserve the issue for appeal,
because it is a constitutional issue, it may be addressed.9 Carroll argued the admission of the wire
recordings put him in a difficult place in deciding whether to testify. The Court noted, however,
that the same may be said about essentially every incriminating piece of evidence offered by the
State and facing a difficult decision to testify, does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.10
Because Carroll did not testify and was still able to put the wire recordings into their proper
context, the Court determined Carroll failed to demonstrate his right against self-incrimination was
violated. The Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
Carroll’s or his coconspirators’ statements from the wire recordings.
Police interrogation
Whether police coerced Carroll’s statement
Carroll argued the police coerced his statement by promising him leniency 11 if he
implicated himself in Hadland’s murder. The primary consideration for determining voluntariness
is the “totality of the circumstances”12 and “whether the defendant’s will was overborne when he
confessed.”13 Factors to consider include: “the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his
low intelligence; the lack of any advice of constitutional rights; the length of detention; the
repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the

United States v. Patel, 879 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1989) (for withdrawal to limit a conspirator’s liability…the
defendant must take affirmative steps by making a “clean breast” to the authorities).
8
State v. Davis, 528 P.2d 117 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
9
See McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 74, 657 P.2d 117, 1158 (1983).
10
See Dzul v. State, 118 Nev. 681, 693, 56 P.3d 875, 883 (2002).
11
The question decided by the Court was whether the police promised Carroll leniency when they promised to take
him home.
12
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1990).
13
Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987).
7
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deprivation of food or sleep.” 14 In considering the Passama factors, the Court determined the
police did not coerce Carroll’s statement.
Carroll further argued the police promised him leniency and that he would not go to jail.
However, the Court found the record did not indicate any such promises. The Court acknowledged
that Carroll may have misunderstood the detectives’ statements as a promise of leniency, the
promise of taking Carroll home at the conclusion of the interrogation does not render the
statements coerced or involuntary.
Whether Carroll was in custody for Miranda purposes
Carroll argued the police violated his Miranda rights. The question for the Court was
whether Carroll was in custody for purposes of Miranda and, if so, whether he properly received
Miranda warnings. A custody determination is reviewed de novo15 and because the district court
was remiss in their duty and failed to issue an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, this court cannot give deference to any factual findings.16
Miranda warnings are required “when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation”17
and statements made during a custodial interrogation may be admitted at trial only if Miranda
rights are administered and validly waived. 18 Custody is determined by the totality of the
circumstances, “including the site of the interrogation, whether the objective indicia of an arrest
are present, and the length and form of questioning.”19
Site of the interrogation
The Court determined the site of the interrogation indicated Carroll was in police custody
when he gave his statement because the questioning was conducted after Carroll was transported
in an official police vehicle to the homicide office as opposed to the Palomino Club where Carroll
was located or his residence. This conclusion was furthered by the detective’s admission that the
homicide office was a “more intimidating place to question a witness.” The interrogation room
was small, had one door, and two detectives were placed between Carroll and the door.
Importantly, because police drove Carroll to the office for questioning, Carroll could not terminate
the interrogation or leave the office unless the detectives agreed and gave him a ride home.
The Court also distinguished the site of interrogation in Silva20 from Carroll’s. In Silva, the
Court held that questioning a suspect at a police station does not automatically mean that he was
in custody. 21 However, the Court noted the circumstances in Silva and the circumstances in
Carroll’s interrogation were different. Specifically, Silva was permitted to speak with his sister
and the police did not make any promises.22 Carroll on the other hand, was not allowed to use his
phone, the police took away his phone, the police did not take him home when he indicated he
14
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Id.
Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 190, 111 P.3d 690, 694 (2005).
Id.
Archanian v. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1038, 145 P.3d 1008, 1021 (2006).
Koger v. State, 117 Nev. 138, 141, 17 P.3d 428, 430 (2001).
Taylor v. State, 114 Nev. 1071, 1081—82, 968 P.2d 315, 323 (1998).
Silva v. State, 113 Nev. 1365, 951 P.2d 591 (1997).
Silva, 113 Nev. at 1370, 951 P.2d at 594.
Id.
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wanted to go home, and the detectives promised Carroll they would confirm his claim that he did
not murder Hadland and was acting under direction of Palomino Club management. Thus, the
Court determined Silva was distinguishable and the site of interrogation suggested custody.
Objective indicia of arrest
Objective indicia of arrest comprise the following:
1) whether the suspect was told that the questioning was voluntary or that he was
free to leave; 2) whether the suspect was not formally under arrest; 3) whether the
suspect could move about freely during questioning 4) whether the suspect
voluntarily responded to questions; 5) whether the atmosphere of questioning was
police-dominated; 6) whether the police used strong-arm tactics or deception during
questioning; and 7) whether the police arrested the suspect at the termination of
questioning.23
1) The Court found the first factor weighed in favor of Carroll based on the following: The
objective indicia of arrest indicated Carroll was in police custody when he gave his statement; the
interrogating detectives did not tell Carroll he was free to leave; at the beginning of Carroll’s
interview the detective informed him he was not under arrest “right now”; police did not provide
Miranda warnings until the interrogation was two-thirds finished and Carroll had implicated
himself in the murder; and Carroll repeatedly informed detectives that he wanted to go home prior
to making the implicating statements, but these requests were refused.
2) The Court found the second factor weighed in the State’s factor because police informed
Carroll he was not under formal arrest when he was questioned.
3) The Court found the third factor weighed in Carroll’s favor because the interrogation
room was very small, prevented Carroll from moving freely, and he could not leave the
room without asking the detectives to move.
4) The Court found the fourth factor weighed in Carroll’s favor because the transcript of
the statement demonstrates he voluntarily responded to the detective’s questions. The
Court specifically noted that Carroll repeatedly voiced his apprehension in speaking
candidly to detectives, indicated he did not want to get in trouble because he had a child at
home, and indicated he feared for his life and the idea of going to jail.
5) The Court found this factor clearly and overwhelmingly weighed in favor of Carroll
based on the fact that two detectives questioned him throughout the interrogation, when
Carroll requested to make a call to confirm his story the detectives refused and confiscated
his phone, detectives transported Carroll to the homicide office, and detectives did not take
him home when he expressed a desire to go home.
6) The Court determined this factor weighed in favor of Carroll because a detective
deceived Carroll when he claimed police obtained Carroll’s phone records indicating he
23

Taylor, 114 Nev. at 1082 n.1, 968 P.2d 323 n.1.
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was near the scene of the crime when it occurred. The Court also noted that strong-arm
tactics were evident throughout the interrogation in that they transported Carroll to the
homicide office, questioned him in a small room, and confiscated his cell phone.
Additionally, the detectives promised Carroll they would take him home after the
interrogation and prove his story about how Hadland was killed if he told them the truth.
7) Lastly, this factor weighs in favor of the State because Carroll was not arrested at the
end of the interrogation and the detectives took him home.
The Court concluded that only two of the seven factors weighed in the State’s favor,
with one factor neither weighing for or against the State. This left four of the factors
weighing in Carroll’s favor. The Court held the objective indicia of arrest suggested Carroll
was in custody at the time of interrogation.
Length and form of questioning
Carroll was questioned for two and one half hours, excluding breaks. The detectives took
him from his place of employment, across town, to the homicide office, where he was questioned
until almost midnight. A third, more aggressive detective joined the original two detectives in the
questioning. The Court explained the detective’s testimony that one purpose of the breaks was to
let Carroll “kind of go a little bit crazy” suggests he was questioned as a suspect, not a witness.
This lead the Court to conclude that the length and form of questioning suggested Carroll was in
custody at the time of the interrogation.
The detectives chose not to provide Carroll Miranda warnings until the last of the three
detectives began questioning him, after he had already made inculpatory statements. The Court
held that although Carroll was not under formal arrest, he was in custody and should have received
Miranda warnings. The Court concluded the district court erred in failing to suppress Carroll’s
statements.
Post-Miranda statements
The Court also concluded that Carroll’s statement to police after he received the Miranda
warnings should have been suppressed based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Seibert.24 In
Seibert, police delayed recitation of Miranda warnings until the defendant confessed to the crime.
The Supreme Court in Seibert determined these type of warnings do not serve their intended
purpose and ruled the post-warning statements inadmissible.25 The Court determined the actions
of the detectives with Carroll are indistinguishable from those in Seibert as Carroll’s post-warning
statements were simply a recitation of his pre-warning statements. The Court explained that despite
the short break in questioning, Carroll was subjected to continuous questioning. Thus, the Court
concluded the district court should have suppressed Carroll’s post-Miranda statement to police.
However, although the Court determined the district court erred in failing to suppress the
statements, the Court concluded the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

24
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Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
Id. at 617.

6

was harmless26 because the district court properly admitted other powerful evidence of Carroll’s
guilt.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Carroll contended the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy
to commit murder because the State failed to show he intended for Counts to kill Hadland. The
Nevada Supreme Court concluded this contention had no merit because the evidence at trial did in
fact support a finding that Carroll knew the order was to kill Hadland and Carroll recruited Counts
for this purpose.
Cumulative error
Carroll contended cumulative error denied him a fair trial. The Nevada Supreme Court
disagreed finding the sole error was the district court’s denial of Carroll’s motion to suppress his
statement to police. The Nevada Supreme Court stated a sole error cannot be cumulative.
Conclusion
Carroll was entitled to suppression of both his pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements
as he was in custody and not read his Miranda rights. The district court erred in failing to suppress
the statements. However, the Court affirmed Carroll’s convictions finding this error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

26

See Boehm v. State, 113 Nev. 910, 916, 944 P.2d 269, 273 (1997) (applying harmless error analysis to a
statement admitted at trial in violation of Miranda).
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